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ABSTRACT
The study of the role of tenancy in paddy production is very 
important since tenancy may have affected the performance of rice 
intensification programs through which the government intends to 
increase production. The Department of Agriculture has assumed that 
a tenant may have less incentive than an owner-operator to increase 
production and to participate in the intensification programs. If 
this is so, then production may be increased by changing the 
institutional setting through tenancy reform.
This study attempts to test the effect of tenure status and farm 
size on the allocation of resources used in paddy production. The 
profit function approach is used to test for allocative efficiency 
differences between farms of different tenure status and cultivated
area. This was done by measuring relative economic efficiency, relative
price efficiency, relative technical efficiency and absolute price 
efficiency. In order to know the effectiveness of price policy, the
output supply response and labour demand functions are derived from
the profit function.
The results show that tenure status is not a constraint on
increased paddy production. However rearranging the institutional
setting through tenancy reform might reduce oligopsonistic power in
which is currently
the land market, / restricting the transfer of operating control 
over agricultural land from the poor to the rich. Paddy price 
policies still have some positive effect in increasing paddy supply.
v
If the government redistributed the rice field land up to the
minimum of 
losses and
0.5 hectare, then there would not be 
there would probably be improvements
substantial efficiency 
in income equality.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1•1 Formulation of the Problem
The study of the role of tenancy relationships in paddy production 
is very important in rural Java for at least two reasons:
1. The government has in the past devoted considerable resources 
to rice intensification programs in order to increase paddy 
production. Tenancy relations have been suggested as an 
important constraint on the effectiveness of these programs.
2. Tenancy relations are also crucial to the Government's effort 
to reduce income inequality and poverty.
Since 1968 a series of paddy intensification programs have been 
implemented to achieve the objective of increasing paddy production. 
Production has to be increased in order to meet the expected increase 
in demand arising from expanding population and rising incomes. To do 
this the government has implemented several intensification programs.
These programs include the introduction of new high yielding 
varieties, provision of production credit at subsidized rates, and the 
supply of inputs such as fertilizer at subsidized prices. Farmers' 
skills are to be improved through the more widespread provision of 
agricultural extension services. A floor price scheme for rice has 
been implemented in order to support paddy farm incomes. Prices of 
major inputs such as fertilizer and pesticides have also been fixed by
the Government.
2Production of paddy has not, however, reached the targets set in 
1975/6 (in the middle of the second Five Year Development Plan or 
REPELITA II). Mears (1981,p.21) reported that the annual average rate 
of increase for paddy yield in Java between 1953/55 and 1965/67 was 
0.9%; between 1968/69 and 1973/74 it rose to a rate of 3.0% per year, 
but between 1968/69 and 1977/78 it decreased again to only 2.0% per 
year. This means a declining growth rate during the period 1973/74 to 
1977/78.
The Agricultural Department has proposed that tenure status is 
one of the 12 possible variables which are responsible for the 
shortfall the in target yield of paddy (Department of Agriculture, 
1978 as quoted by Sinaga and Kasryno, 1980,p.40). The Department 
assumes that the tenant farmers may not have the same incentive as 
owner-operators to participate in the intensification programs or to 
increase production. This implies that present tenure status is seen 
by policy makers as a crucial factor in raising paddy production.
Tenancy arrangements may affect not only production, but also the 
income distribution and hence rural poverty in rural Java. Before 
discussing tenancy arrangements in general, it is necessary to 
distinguish two types of tenancy common in the villages of West Java: 
fixed-renting (hereafter called renting) in which a tenant has to pay 
a fixed amount of rent; and sharecropping in which a fixed ratio of 
harvest output is paid as rent.
Renting can be said to be a transfer of economic surplus from 
land operated by the poor Ismail farmers or landless labour) to 
the rich. Sharecropping shifts economic surplus in the opposite 
direction, that is the transfer of land operation from the wealthy
3landowners to the relatively small farmers or labourers (Figure 1 .1).
The reason for this transfer of economic surplus is that the 
renting system involves capital (money or in kind) to which only the 
rich have access. Hence, if the small farmers intend to rent, they 
will face oligopsonistic power in the land market (Bardhan ,1973). 
Other examples of the relative weakness of sharecroppers ' bargaining 
position have been reported by various researchers.In a village in 
Central Java, Husken (1978,p.144) reported that the sharecropper and 
his family have to do some extra work for the landowner without pay. 
In other villages in Central Java, Utami and Ihalauw ( 1973,p.52) 
reported that a sharecropper has to give some money in advance to the 
owner (called sromo) in order to get the right to share his land in 
the future. Therefore, this is the mechanism by which tenancy affects
income distribution and poverty in rural areas.
Figure 1.1 Transfer of Operating Land
in Land Market.
SHARECROPPING-OUT
RENT-OUT
5Sayogyo has shown that poverty has increased in Java between 1970 
and 1976 ( Sayogyo, 1977,p.6). According to him in 1976 around 59% of 
rural Javanese people lived below his definition of the poverty line.
Unfortunately, macro data which come from the Agricultural Census 
(1963 and 1973) do not record the data on the size of land owned but 
only the farm size. Booth and Sundrum (1976,pp.96-98) analyzed the 
distribution of farm size during a 10 year period (Agricultural Census 
1963 and 1973) and concluded that there had been no important changes 
in farm size in Java (Gini Index 0.434 in 1963 and 0.433 in 1973). 
They also indicate that wholly owned small farms had increased from 
59% of total farms in 1963 to 73% in 1973. The lower tenancy rates 
indicate that there has been a decline in concentration of land 
ownership or practice of sharecropping and renting.
If there is no change in farm size, it does not follow that there 
is no change in the structure of land ownership and tenure. As White 
( 1979) argues:
"Maintenance of the same pattern of farm size distribution among 
the relative smaller proportion of the rural population who have 
access to land, itself implies a less equal distribution of 
access to land among the population as a whole. Furthermore, it 
is quite possible, and perhaps even probable, that increasing 
unequal distribution of land ownership might co-occur with an 
unchanging distribution of farm size as (a) the very small owners 
are increasingly eliminated as their land is purchased by larger 
owners, (b) large owners (particularly absentee owners) let out 
their accumulated property in small size parcels to tenant or 
sharecropper farmers" (White, 1979,p.103).
If his argument is correct, one would expect that the tenancy rate 
would increase or the proportion of wholly owned farms would fall. A 
large area of land owned does not necessarily mean a large farm 
operation because the owner might sharecrop out to other small farmers
6or labourers. Again White (1979) says:
"This finding once again surprises those who have done field 
research in Java and have returned with the strong conviction 
(even if they were unable to demonstrate it by accurate 
measurement) that a fairly rapid concentration of holdings has 
been occurring including rapidly increased absentee ownership by 
urban elites" (White, 1979,p.102).
Hie Rural Dynamic Study's Agro-Economic Survey (hereafter called 
RDSAES) conducted research in 800 villages in the Cimanuk River Basin, 
West Java in 1975. From the micro data White and Wiradi (1979) 
conclude that
"The variation in the tenancy rates between Kabupatens broadly
matches the variations in indicators of
landlessness....... , which is what we should expect if
landlessness and tenancy are parallel symptoms of the
concentration of ownership of land" (White and Wiradi,1979,p.37)
Micro studies from RDS AES show that the increase the concentration of 
landownership, absentee ownership and landless labour have raised 
the tenancy rate in rural Java. This implies that the number of 
wholly owned farms may have fallen.
1.2 Objective of the Study
The main objective of the study is to answer the basic question 
of what is the effect of tenancy and farm size on efficiency of 
resources used. Farm size is important to the discussion of resouce 
allocation, since tenancy and farm size may interact with each other.
7If it can be shown that there are few if any differences in 
allocative efficiency between tenancy groups and farm size groups, 
then it would indicate the possibility of simultaneously increasing 
paddy production and improving the distribution of production in 
rural areas. If such a possibility were to be established, a wider 
range of equity based policy options can be proposed for Indonesia and 
West Java in particular.
The implications of this study become important in regard to 
future possible revisions or implementation of the Basic Sharecropping 
Law of 1966 (UUPBH). According to the the World Bank (1975):
"Tenurial reform, whether through the distribution of the land to 
those working it or provision of the greater security of tenure 
and improved rental contracts, have an effect on development. 
Such reforms improve income distribution by shifting income away 
from the landlords to smallscale producers, often those among the 
lowest income groups. The more secure producers tend to invest 
part of their earnings in their holding -thus raising the level of 
investment in agricultural production activities. Finally, 
greater security enables tenants to benefit from appropriate 
technological changes instead of being displaced when landlords 
find it to their advantage to adopt a different technology. The 
financial returns to the landlord from using machines and hired 
labour may be high, but the returns to the economy are usually 
higher from labour-intensive operations undertaken by 
smallholders"(World Bank,1975,p•34-35).
Hence,the reform would focus not only on how to increase production 
but also on how to reduce poverty and inequality of distribution of 
income. These policy issues have become the central theme of rural 
development of Indonesia in the 1980's(see the papers presented in the 
Fourth Indonesian Agricultural Economist Association conference,
edited by Mubyarto,1982).
CHAPTER II
THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF TENANCY
In the paddy production unit, at least 2 types of land arrangement can 
be found:
(1) a farmer owns the land which he tills,
(2) a farmer cultivates rented land under either fixed rent or 
sharecropping and with or without shared input costs.
The part tenant and part owner arrangement is also commonly found in 
the villages. This study,however, focuses on pure land arrangements, 
i.e wholly owner-operated, rented and sharecropped.
The decision to rent or sharecrop the land depends upon economic 
as well as non-economic factors. For example, sharecropping may occur 
among the family members. A father who has become old, may share the 
land with his son before it becomes heritable. Of course, in this 
relation, the proportion of output paid and proportion of cost shared 
are not explained by economic behaviour. But in this study it is 
assumed that the decision is based purely on the economic grounds of 
how to reach maximum profit. It is also assumed that a farmer is a 
rational enterpreneur who maximizes his farm income by producing 
output where marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost.
TVo approaches can be used to explain the economics of tenancy. 
The Marshallian approach and the Chicago school approach will be
described in the following section.
92.1 Marshallian Approach
This theory was formulated by economists such as Marshall(1947), 
Issawi(1957), Adams and Rasks(1968), Sen (1963), Bardhan and 
Srinivasan(1976), and Bell and Zusman(1976). Marshall said that
"When the cultivator has to give to his landlord half of the 
returns to each dose of capital and labour that he applies to the 
land, it will not be to his interest to apply any dose the total 
return to which is less than twice enough to reward
him.......... ,he will apply only so much capital and labour as
will give him returns more than twice enough to repay himself; 
so that his landlord will get a smaller share even of those 
returns than he would have on the plan of a fixed 
payment"(Marshall, 1947,p.644)
Under sharecropping a proportion of every output produced is paid 
to rent. This type of rent is exactly the same as a proportional tax. 
That is why it is sometimes called the tax-equivalent theory.
According to this approach, sharecropping is an inefficient 
allocation of resources, and does not provide an incentive to use new 
technology compared with renting and owner-operation. This hypothesis 
can be described in the geometric model shown in Figure 2.1. The 
horizontal axis is a variable input (say labour) while other inputs 
(land and capital) are assumed fixed. The vertical axis is output per
unit of labour.
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Figure 2.1 Sharecropping with and without 
Share Cost
Product
Labour
or Lr
Labour
For simplicity, it is assumed that ;
(1) the sharecropping arrangement (r %) is based on 50% of the 
harvesting output,
(2) the marginal product of variable input (labour) is linear and 
the price of output is constant in a competitive market. 
Therefore, the value of marginal product of labour is also 
linear;
(3) risk and uncertainty are not considered in the production 
process.
There are 3 types of farmer (owner-operator, renter, and 
sharecropper) to be discussed. The marginal product of labour for 
owner-operator is 9q/9l (AJ) and the marginal product of labour for 
share-tenant is ( 1-r ) ( 9Q/9L ) or BJ. Because of a 50-50 sharing 
arrangement, so ( 1-r ) ( 9Q/9L) is equal to half of 9Q/9L (or OB=BA). 
By that type of sharecropping, half of marginal product goes to 
landowner, which is why share-lease has affected the marginal 
conditions for profit maximising use of resources. In contrast, the 
renter (i.e.fixed-renter) does not affect marginal conditions, since 
the cost is a constant value subtracted from value of the total 
output, that is OTRS. CF is the marginal factor cost (MFC*) for 
variable input (labour) where the price of labour is also assumed 
constant (i.e. competitive labour market is assumed), This assumption 
might be reasonable enough in rural Java in where the Government does 
not interfere in rural wages, and off-farm labour markets are well
developed.
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The owner operator will use the amount of labour 0L° in order to 
get maximum profit. At point F, the marginal revenue is equal to 
marginal cost. He will produce output as large as OAFL in order to 
maximize the producer surplus given by area ACF. The renter also will 
use as much labour as the owner-operator does. He gets the amount of 
the producer surplus of area OAFL, then pays a fixed land rent in the 
amount of OTRS. A sharecropper, however, will reach maximum profits 
at point D, and use the amount of labour OL . He has to pay land rent 
shown by area BDGA. (The mathematical explanation of how each party 
reach maximum profit can be seen in the Appendix 2.1)
Hence the larger share (r) the sharecropper has to pay, the 
larger area of AGDB which belongs to the land-owner and the smaller 
the area of BCD which belongs to him. That is why under sharecropping 
, there will be several sources of economic loss in the society:
(1) A tenant will operate by using input level (0LS ), then area 
GDF becomes net social loss. Therefore, share-tenancy is 
inefficient, since the area CDF represents the economic 
waste.
(2) On the right side of point L , marginal factor cost (MFC) is 
higher than marginal revenue , so the tenant does not intend 
to apply labour over 0LS . That is why this type of lease 
results in a disincentive to use new technology such as 
fertilizer. Of course the horizontal axis fertilizer could 
also be treated as another variable input. Hence, under 
share tenancy, the tenant has less incentive and is less 
efficient in resource use compared with the owner-operator or
fixed-rent tenant.
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What is the effect of a sharecropping decision when the variable 
cost is paid in the same proportion as output? Adams and Rask 
(1968,p.935-6) distinguished two types of share tenancy:
(1) A traditional lease is a share of output in which all the 
variable inputs are paid by a tenant;
(2) An ideal lease is the share of output in which all variable 
inputs are paid in the same proportion between tenant and 
landowner. In a case where 50% of variable input is paid by 
the landowner, the marginal factor cost (MFC ) will become IE 
(or MFC1) .
How much input will be used by a tenant in order to get maximum 
profit depends upon the type of cost-sharing arrangement. In a 
traditional lease, the maximum profit will be reached by using as much 
labour as OLs where MR=MC. But, in an ideal lease, the maximum profit
O ywill be by using labour in the amount of OL or OL . Unis decision is 
the same as for the owner-operator or fixed-rent tenant. Therefore, 
the application of an ideal lease, will increase the net return to the 
firm from BCD to BIE.
Johnson( 1950,p. 118) suggested that there are three techniques 
that can be used in order to reduce misallocation of resources of 
sharecropping: (1) a contract which is binding on both parties, (2)
variable inputs are shared between both parties in the same proportion 
as for output, (3) a guaranteed short-term lease. He, however,
concentrates on the third technique, saying:
"Short-term lease serves a useful purpose in creating conditions
within which the crop-share lease results in a reasonably
efficient utilization of land" (Johnson,1950,p121).
If this conclusion is accepted, the proposal for tenancy reform in the
14
sense of improving the security of tenant is not necessary any more. 
Sen says that:
"The long run efficiency requirement would conflict with 
insecurity in tenure. These improvements of land that bear fruit 
over a long period of time e.g digging feeder channels from 
irrigation sources, are typically neglected by tenants without 
security of tenure"(Sen,1975,p.69)
2.2 The Chicago School Approach
This approach was originally formulated by Cheung (1968 and 
1969), then extended by other economists such as Newberry(1977) and 
Stiglitz(1974). They do not agree with the inefficiency argument for 
sharecropping of the Marshallian approach for at least two reasons 
which are explained by Cheung(1968,p.1120): (1) The landowner can 
allocate his land to several tenants because of the competitive nature 
of the market for land. This possibility must be taken into account 
in the analysis of sharecropping. (2) The percentage share has to be 
taken as variable rather than fixed.
His analysis is based on how to maximize wealth subject to 
private property rights constraints i-n the free market. If it is 
assumed that cost of contracting is zero, the model analysis can be 
seen in the Figure 2.2. The vertical axis is average product of land 
where land is a variable input. The horizontal axis is the land input 
(h) and other inputs are assumed constant. The land area belonging to 
the landowner is S (fixed in supply). The marginal physical product 
of land (9q/9h ) diminishing as h increases holding other inputs 
constant. Output share charged by the land landowner is r (it can be 
1/2 ,1/3 etc.). The marginal physical product of land for the tenant 
is (9q/9h )(r). Under sharing arrangement (r) the tenant will get 
income of area ABCD while rent paid to the landowner is represented by
BODF.
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Figure 2.2 Sharecropping with One Tenant
Product" (q)
Land (h)
Land (h)/ 1others
constant
Source: Cheung, 1968, p.1108
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There are two ways the landowner can reach maximum wealth: (1) 
Increasing the rental percentage. In this case he has to consider the 
alternative income earning potential of the tenant;(2) Dividing his 
fixed land (S) into several tenants, say for 3 tenants (T1,T2, and T3) 
as shown in Figure 2.3. If it is assumed that the rental percentage 
for each tenant is the same (r), the marginal physical product of each 
tenant is (3q/3h ) r; (9q/3h ^r; and (3q/3h ||*l Because there are 
many tenants in the variable land(s), the marginal physical product of 
land shift upwards and is not fixed as for one tenant (i.e. it does 
not shift). The income for tenants T1,T2 and T3 are, respectively, 
areas ABCD, EFGH and IJKL. A landowners' maximum wealth is 
represented by as areas OBDM + MFHN + NJLP.
Therefore, maximisation of landowner's income with a given area 
of land holding and cost of tenant inputs, is determined by the land 
size per tenant and the rental percentage• But the argument has been 
rejected by such economists as A.K Sen (1975, pp.68-9) who argues that 
in LDC's, share-rent is very sticky because the share-rent is 
determined by institutional and historical factors.
Page 17
Figure 2.3 Sharecropping under Three Tenants
Product (q)
Land (h)
Land/
0 M N P
Source: Cheung, 1968, p.112
others
constant
18
2.3 Conclusions and Hie Approach Used in this Study
The Chicago approach depends strongly on an assumption of 
alternative employment possibility for sharecropper. In most LDCs, 
such as in rural Java, work opportunities for rural labour are not 
great. It is also not valid to assume that the share percentage can 
be made to be variable in rural Java. Share arrangements are mainly 
determined by custom and institution (Sayogjo,1974) and not determined 
by the free market.
Hie approaches have the common implication that if the variable 
input is not shared between two parties, or is shared in a proportion 
less than the rental share, then the share tenant will tend to use less 
of any variable input compared with owner-operator or lease tenant.
Empirical studies of the Marshallian approach of Bell (1977), 
Bell and Zusman (1976) in Bihar, India, and of Zaman (1973) in 
Bangladesh tend to support the Marshallian approach rather than the 
Chicago approach . This study is intended to test the Marshallian 
theory using micro data in paddy production in West Java where land is 
very scarce and labour is relatively abundant. This situation may be 
similar to rural India or Bangladesh.
Some indirect evidence of abundant labour and inadequate 
alternative wage employment opportunity (both in rural and urban areas) 
in rural Java include the following:
(1) Real agricultural wage levels do not seem to have increased 
in recent years and in some cases appear to be falling 
(Makali and Hartoyo,1978).
(2) Labour incomes for small owner-operators or tenants or the
19
wage labourers are low in agriculture. A number of case 
studies between 1973 and 1977 in Java showed that 
non-agricultural rural labour opportunities available to 
landless or near landless offer lower labour income (per day 
or hour of work) than does agricultural work ( White, 1976 
,Husein Sawit,1979).
(3) The various changes in technology and institutions in 
agricultural work have resulted in reduced employment 
opportunities. These include the replacement of the ani-ani 
by the sickle in harvesting, hand threshing by mechanical 
threshing. In post harvest technology, the practice of 
hand-pounding has been replaced by large scale hulling 
machines. In the tebasan system of paddy purchase before 
harvest, the buyer uses less harvest labour ( Collier
et.al,1973, Sinaga and Collier,1975).
CHAPTER III
A DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY AREA AND THE DATA
3.1 Sources of Data
Four villages in West Java were selected for the research in 
1980. Since one aim of the research was to study agrarian change, 
villages were selected where the Agro-Economic Survey (AES) had 
previously done research and where some data from previous years was 
available. Two of the villages, Mariuk in Subang Regency, and Jati in 
Cianjur, had been included in the sample of villages of the AES1 "Rice 
Intensification Study" from 1968 to 1973. The others, Wargabinangun 
in Cirebon Regency and Sukaambit in Sumedang, are two of the sample 
villages in the AES on-going Rural Dynamics Study in West Java, and 
have been visited regularly since 1975. Location of the study is 
shown in the Figure 3.1
Within each of these villages ( Desa or administration units with 
a population of between 500 and 2500 households) a sample community or 
Sampling (with about 100 households each) were randomly selected 
within the four villages. The representativeness of each sample
village was checked against regional data on tenancy rates and 
farm size disbtibution.
Data from the farm management data survey of paddy production of 
dry season 1979 are used in this study. Both pure tenure status as
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well as mixed status farmers were selected. The tenancy composition 
of the paddy farmers included in the study are shown in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1 Distribution of Respondents
Among the Villages by Tenure Status
Tenure Status
Villages
Owner- Renter Sharecropper Mixed a)
operator
1.Jati 25 1 23 25 74
2.Wargabinangun 18 18 24 7 67
3.Mariuk 18 0 15 8 41
4.Sukaambit 30 2 7 8 47
Total 91 21 69 48 229
a)Mixed among owner- 
mortgage, or part
•operator, 
owner and
or renter or sharecropper or 
part tenant.
+ • *4* • + Province boundary
—«n—r Highway
' O
W
<$>
River
District Capitol
Selected village
J Jati
M Mariuk
S Sukaarribit
W Wargabinangun
Figure 3.1 
The Location of Area Study
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3.2 Tenancy Relation
There are three forms of tenancy (rental) relation found in the 
villages. The first form is called renting (sewa) in which a tenant 
has to pay a fixed amount of rent either in money or in kind. The 
second form is called sharecropping (bagi hasil) in which a fixed 
ratio of harvest output is paid as rent. The terms of sharecropping 
differ from district to district, depending upon the rate of rent or 
proportionate share of gross output used. In the study area, the 
common practice of maro indicates that the tenant receives one half 
output as his share. Only in one village, are current inputs 
(fertilizer, seed and chemical ) paid for by the tenant (Table 3.2). 
In other villages, inputs were divided equally between landowner and 
tenant. According to the law (UUPBH of 1960, para. 9) a landowner is 
not allowed to impose land tax on a tenant. However, it still occurs 
in the villages. In Wargabinangun and Mariuk the tenants paid 50% of 
land tax.
The third form is called pawning (gadai). An owner (usually a 
small farmer) who pawns-out his land receives money or an in kind 
payment in advance, then has to pay it back if he wants the land back. 
During period of pawning, the owner has overall control on his land. 
This type of tenancy is relatively rare in the villages. Hence, this 
type of tenancy is not included in the following discussion.
According to the Agrarian Law of 1960 renting, sharecropping and 
mortgage are only temporary rights. By contrast, landownership is the 
most secure of all rights. As described in Chapter I, renting and 
sharecropping may be positively correlated with unequal distribution
of land ownership. The more unequal the distribution of land
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ownership, the more common the practice of renting and sharecropping. 
In all villages it was found that the distribution of land-operation 
is more equal compared with distribution of land-ownership. The Gini 
Index for land-operation in each village varied from 0.49 to 0.76, 
while the Gini Index for land-ownership was 0.57 to 0.91 (Makali and 
Wiradi,1980,p.51). The size distribution is also shown by Lorenz 
Curve (Appendix 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5}. This indicates that tenancy 
rate is high in all villages. This conclusion is also supported by 
the data on transfer of land during 1975 to 1979 (Table 3.3). The 
majority of land transferred was through tenancy then followed by 
selling.
Data to answer the question why is a small farmer renting-out his 
land is not available in the villages. However, data from an RDS-AES 
study in two villages of East Java show that the main reason a small 
farmer rents-out is to buy food and other household necessities. Most 
of respondents ( 32% in Village A, 42% in village B) reported that the 
main reason to rent-out was to obtain money to pay for basic household 
needs such as food (Soentoro, et.al 1981,p.59). Thus it may be said 
that poverty has an important effect on tenancy rates.
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Table 3.2 The Proportion of Yield and Farm Cost shared 
by the Sharecropper in four Villages,
West Java, Dry Season 1979
Proportion Shared by Sharecropper
Wargabinangun Mariuk Jati Sukaambit
Yield 50 50 50 50
Cost:
1.Production Inputs 50 50 100 50
2.Pre-Harvest Labour 100 100 100 100
3•Harvest Labour 50 50 50 50
4.Land Tax, Pancen,
and Suksara Desa 50 50 0 0
a) including seed,fertilizer,pestiside.
b) Pancen is contribution drawn from the household base on
the size of owned land, and used for salaries of the village 
officials in villages where there is no benkok or the size 
of benkok is too small.
Suksara Desa is contribution drown from landowners used for 
various village's expenditures such as repairing road, etc . 
Source: Makali and Wiradi,1980,p.68
Absentee land-ownership seems to be correlated with the tenancy 
rates. Data are not available from all villages, but one village 
(Table 3.3) shows an increasing frequency of purchases of land by 
townspeople 1975 to 1979 . The land bought by absentee land-owners 
may be sharecropped out to small farmers or labourers in the village. 
This implies an increase in tenancy rates under sharecropping.
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Tables 3.3 Distribution of Total Land Transfers by Type of 
Land Transaction in Four Villages, 1975 -1979
Villages
Transacted
land (Ha)
Proportion of Transacted area via
Inherited
(%)
Sale
(%)
Tenancy
(%)
Pawned
(%)
Wargabinangun 7.28 16 29 55 0
Mariuk 23.90 8 16 62 15
Sukaambit 9. 16 36 28 36 0
Jati 13.94 4 20 55 21
Source: Kasryno, 1981,p.14
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Table 3•4 Purchases of Sawah by City People a), 
Village Jati, Cianjur,1979
Year No. of
Cases
Size
(Ha.)
Average Size
Per Case (Ha.)
1973 2 0.512 0.258
1974 3 1. 190 b) 0.397
1975 3 0.761 0.254
1976 16 4.849 0.303
1977 5 1.890 0.378
1978 8 2.166 0.271
1979 17 7.634 b) 0.449
Total 54 19.002 0.350
Note: a) People from Bandung, Cianjur, Sukabumi, 
Jakarta, and Cimahi.
b) Included one case of dry land transaction. 
Source: Makali and Wiradi, 1980,p•61
3.3 Paddy production input
Labour is relatively abundant in rural Java and is an important 
factor in paddy production. Labour used according to specific tasks 
among farmers of different tenure status is presented in Table 3.5. 
Animal power is used relatively little compared with human labour in 
field-preparation. Field preparation, transplanting and weeding are 
tasks which use relatively greater amounts of labour compared with
other preharvest tasks.
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Although, there are differences, in the average labour used by 
tasks among farms of different tenure status, none of the differences 
are statistically significant using the appropriate F-test implying 
that tenure status may not affect labour used in the paddy production.
The wages paid for different tasks are presented in Table 3.6. 
The wages paid to female and male labour differ not only in money but 
also in kind (such as meals). Male labour is paid higher than female: 
however, data presented in the Table 3.6 is a weighted average. None 
of the task are done by males or females alone, except for field 
preparation. In transplanting for example, men transport the 
seedlings to the area to be planted, while the women plant it. If the 
man is dominant in a certain task, the wages will be higher than for 
tasks in which female labour is dominant.
In the task of harvesting, the wage is a certain proportion of 
paddy output called bawon. The bawon in the study area is 1/10 or 
1/11. In some villages such as Wargabinangun and Sukaambit, some 
farmers practice either bawon or ceblokan to pay the harvesting task. 
Ceblokan is the way wages are paid at harvesting for those labourers 
who have worked in transplanting or weeding without payment other than 
meals. Then the labourer will have the right to a share of 1/5 or 1/6 
of paddy harvested. By this type of contract labour, the landowner 
can secure labour in the peak season. This can be said to be one type 
of transfer of risk from the owner to the labourer.
All the sample villages have relatively good irrigation, which 
may be a reason why almost all farmers double crop paddy• Almost all 
of the farmers used the high yielding variety (HYV) which is resistant 
to Brown Plant Hopper. Seed could be bought in the village
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cooperatives (BUUD/KUD) or was supplied to the farmers who 
participated in the rice intensification program (BIMAS).
Around 355 kg per hectare of fertilizer (Urea, TSP and NPK) was 
used. It was relatively easy for the farmer to buy it either from 
private fertilizer dealers in the villages, in neighbouring villages, 
or in the village cooperative. Accessibility to such facilities as 
marketing, credit etc , can be seen in Appendix 3.1, Use of inputs 
such as fertilizer, seed, and pesticide, and yield are not 
statistically significant between groups of tenure status (see Table 
3.7). One may conclude from the F-tests that tenure status does not 
have an important impact on yield or input use.
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Table 3.5 Labour Used per Hectare (in hours) in Paddy
Production by Tasks and Tenure, dry season 1979
Tenure Status
Tasks Total
Owner Renter Sharecropper
(n= 181) (n=91) (n=21) (n=69)
Seed-beed 75 70 91 76 0.369
Field Prep.:
Man - animal 31 34 21 28 0.327
Man only 438 439 282 485 1.003
Transplanting 214 213 209 217 0.012
Weeding,Wtrg. 451 483 420 419 0.455
Fertilizing,
Spraying 55 51 73 55 0.615
Pre-harvesting:
man only 1,249 1,274 1,086 1,266 0.316
animal only 15 17 11 14 0.327
Harvesting 406 371 431 444 0.365
a) all differences insignificant at 10%
Table 3.6 Wages per hour by Tasks in
Paddy Production, Dry Season,1979
Tasks Rp/hour a)
Seeding 32.37
Field Prep.
Man-animal 106.98
Man only 60.76
Transplanting 46.81
Weeding, Wtrg. 36.21
Fertilizing,
Spraying 21.36
Pre-harvesting
(human only) 62.09
Harvesting b) 104.96
a) including meals
b) is paid in Paddy only
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Table 3.7 Paddy Production and Input Application 
by Tenure Status, Dry Season 1979
Output/
Input
(per Ha.)
Total -
(n=181)
Tenure Status
Owner Renter
(n=91) (n=21)
Share
(n=69)
-- F-Test
Yield (kg) 3,316 2,996 3,023 3,827 1.704
Seed (kg) 43 38 43 49 1.831
Pestiside(Rp) 2,343 2,655 1,372 2,226 2. 186
Fertilizer(kg) 357 378 355 330 0.336
Pre-harvesting
Labour(hours):
animal 15 17 11 14 0.327
man 1,249 1,274 1,086 1,266 0.316
Watering(Rp) 1,881 1,690 3,339 1,685 1,361
Size (Ha) 0.4435 0.4614 0.5417 0.3900 1. 141
Cash Capital
(Rp) b) 42,386 44,251 40,275 40,567 0.166
a) all differences insignificant at 10%
b) including seed,pestiside,fertilizer,animal power and watering
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We now turn to a discussion of the behaviour of the farmers according 
to farm size. As shown in Table 3.8, the average size of
operational-holding among 229 farmers in the area study is 0.5078
hectare. Based on the average size, a small farmer is defined here as 
one who operated less than 0.5 hectare, a large farmer is one who operated 
land greater or equal to 0.5 hectare. The sample average is quite 
close to the national average for farm size. According to the 
Agricultural Census of 1973, the average farm size was 0.6 hectare, but 
the Census excluded farms of less than 0.05 hectare wet land or sawah 
land, 0.1 hectare dry land, or 0.075 hectare mixed.
Small farmers used relatively more seed and water than large
farmers, but the yield difference between them was insignificant. In 
comparing preharvesting labour between small and large farms, the
difference is significant at the 1 per cent level. This
difference is mainly due to higher labour use in field preparation, 
transplanting and weeding (see tables 3.8 and 3.9). So it can be 
concluded that the small farmers may use labour more intensively than
large farmers.
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Table 3.8 Production and Input Application per
Hectare in Paddy by Size,Dry Season 1979
Output and S i z e
Inputs used Total — F-Test
(per Ha) ^,0.5 < 0.5
(n=229) (n=87) (n=142)
Yield (kg) 3,323 2,976 3,535 1.994
Seed (kg) 43 37 46 3.312 *)
Fertilizer (kg) 348 309 371 1.858
Pesticide (RP) 2,324 2,358 2,304 0.023
Water (Rp) 1,611 1,003 1,983 3.350 *)
Pre Harvesting
Labour(hours):
animal 15 14 16 0.159
human 1,217 885 1421 19.359***)
Farm size(Ha) 0.5078 0.9806 0.2182 261.873***)
Cash Capital a) 41,148 37,916 43, 128
a) including seed,fertilizer, pesticide,water and animal power 
***) significant at 1%
*) significant at 10%
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Table 3.9 Labour Used per Ha. (in hours) in
Paddy production by Tasks and Size
Total
Tasks
(n=229)
Size ( Ha.)
^,0.5
(n=87)
< 0.5
(n=142)
— F-Test
Seed-bed 68 62 71 0.550
Field Prep.
man-animal 31 28 32 0. 159
man only 434 292 522 9.99***)
Transplanting 211 165 238 7.862***)
Weeding, Wtrg. 437 308 516 13.878***)
Fertilizing,
Spraying 53 44 58 1.849
Pre-harvesting:
animal only 15 14 16 0. 159
man only 1 ,217 885 1421 19.359***)
Harvesting 381 362 392 0. 188
***) Significant at 1%
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3.4 Decription of the Variables
The analyses of variance (ANOVA) which have already been 
discussed above, were used to test the null hypothesis that the 
different tenure status groups and different size groups produce equal 
yields or use the same amount of inputs on average. Total variation 
of yields of paddy of each group was broken down into separate inputs 
such as fertilizer, labour etc. However, ANOVA cannot give us a 
numerical value for the influence of the various explanatory factors 
and tenurial variables on the yield as dependent variable. To solve 
this problem it is necessary to use regression analysis. By this 
analysis one can test the overall significance of regressions, and 
test the improvement in fit due to introduction of new variables. The 
relationship between output and inputs will be estimated by production 
function analysis and will be discussed in the next chapter.
The specification of the important variables and prices in paddy 
production are as follows:
Paddy Production (V) is gross paddy output per farm in physical
terms (Kg).
Labour input (L) in hours per farm includes unpaid family labour and 
exchange labour as well as hired labour. Only 
pre-harvesting labour is considered in the paddy production 
process. Total hours of preharvesting labour is the sum of 
labour use by tasks. The total hours by task is calculated 
by multiplication of quantity of male or female labour by 
days of working and hours of working per day. It is assumed 
that female hours and male hours are the same. In certain 
tasks such as field preparation, males perform better than
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females, while the other tasks, such as weeding or 
transplanting, females perform better; in this study it is 
assumed, they are the same because of lack of data.
Cash Capital (K) consists of value of seed, fertilizer (N,P and NPK), 
pesticide, water and the value of animal power. The reason 
these are combined is that the profit function approach 
requires a measure of variability of input prices. As is 
well known, the price of fertilizers and pesticides are 
almost entirely controlled by the government through 
BUUD/KUD at the village level. Animal power is relatively 
little used in paddy production in this area. The value of 
the seed and fertilizer is quantity multiplied by its price. 
The price of animal power is estimated as the value of joint 
wages (man and animal) less the value of man labour
per unit of time. Then, this value is multiplied by animal 
hours used.
Land (T) is area of paddy planted in hectares.
Wages (W) for pre-harvest labour are calculated from payment made to 
hired labour. Wages include both cash and in-kind
such as meals. Average pre-harvest wage per hour is 
calculated by total wages paid to pre-harvesting tasks 
divided by total hours of hired labour used.
Price of Paddy (P) per Kg. is calculated at farm gate price at 
harvesting time. Farm gate price is the best price to use, 
since it does not involve marketing services. If the farmer 
did not sell paddy at the harvest time, he was asked the 
price he would have received if he wanted to sell.
CHAPTER IV
PRODUCTION FUNCTION ANALYSIS
As described earlier, the objective of the study is to analyze the 
efficiency of resource allocation among different farms grouped by 
tenure status and farm size. There are three types of efficiency to 
be distinguished:
(1) Technical efficiency or the maximum output from a given set 
of inputs.
(2) Price efficiency will occur to a firm when it has the ability 
to reach maximum profit. This means that a firm can equate 
marginal revenue product to its marginal factor cost.
(3) Economic efficiency which consists of technical and price 
efficiency when they occur jointly. 1 The price efficiency 
and technical efficiency are necessary, and also, when 
occuring jointly, they are sufficient conditions for economic 
efficiency' (Yotopoulos and Nugent, 1976,p.73).
The efficiency approach raises some policy implications such as
(1) in LDCs there are possibilities of substitution between 
capital which is scarce and labour which is abundant.
(2) It may be possible to increase paddy output from the existing 
resources.
(3) Farm incomes from paddy may be increased by either increased 
fertilizer and labour inputs if the output elasticity with 
respect to inputs are positive, or reallocation of resources
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where there is current misallocation of resources.
The problem then arises of how to measure and test efficiency. This 
will be discussed in the following section.
4.1 Production Function Approach
Efficiency can be measured by the average production function 
approach. This has been done by many economists such as Hmmer 
(1970) ) and Massel and Johnson (1968). The present study uses three 
functional forms - namely Cobb-Douglas, Transcendental, and 
Transcendental Logarithmic. The production functions are described 
for the case of one output and three inputs as follows:
(1) The Cobb-Douglas production function is
“l ^T
V = A L K T (4.1)
In the terms of natural logarithms it becomes
Ln V. = Ln A + a Ln L. + 6T,Ln K. + 6mLn T. + u 1. (4.1a)l Li Kl 'Ti l
where A is constant and i is sample size (i=1,2...n)
The general form of the function is shown by Henderson and Quandt
(1971,p.80) and Timmer ( 1970,p.112 and 1971,p.779).
(2) The Transcendental production function is
“l ■ BT l K T 
V =A L K' T e e e (4.2)
Taking the natural logarithms gives
Ln V = Ln A + a hn L. + B^Ln K. + B Ln T. + a. L + a K + a T £ L iK l l i -Lizj-jx
+ u2. (4.2a)
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The general form of the transcendental production function 
is discussed by Halter et.al (1957,pp.967-71)
(3) The Transcendental Logarithmic is
2LnV = LnA + aLnL+RLnK + 6 Ln T. + 1/2 a (Ln L.) +L l K l T l 1 l
1/2 a (Ln K,)2 +1/2 a (Ln T)2 + a/Ln L. ) (Ln K. ) +
2 l 3 l 4 l l
a (Ln L ) (Ln T. ) + (Y (Ln K. ) (Ln T. ) + u3. (4.3)5116111
The general form of the function is shown by Christensen 
et.al, (1973,p.33,and 1971,p.225)
4.2 Results of Production Function Estimates
The best form of the production function on economic and 
statistical grounds is selected for subsequent analysis and 
interpretation. The function is selected by examining R square, 
adjusted R square, Standard Error, F-Ratio and the number of 
significant estimates of production parameters. The results of direct
production function estimation are shown in Tables 4.1, 4,2, and 4.3. 
Cobb-Douglas production function has 6 significant parameters and 
correct sign of the parameters, the highest F-Ratio and the lowest 
standard error. The transcendental production function has 4 
significant parameters and slightly lower adjusted R. But none of the 
power terms are significant indicating the Cobb-Douglas is preferred.
The
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The translog production function has only 4 parameters which are
significantly different from zero, two parameters have the wrong sign
and some important variables such as land and cash capital are not
significant. All three functional forms show very similar goodness of
fit results such as the adjusted R square. However, the translog
production function may suffer from serious multicollinearity as shown
in the correlation matrix in Appendix 4.2. (compared with correlation
matrix of the Cobb-Douglas, the highest coefficient that is observed
from this matrix is 0.77 as shown in Appendix 4.1). Correlation among 
2Ln K and (Ln K) is 0.996, Ln L and (Ln L)(Ln K) is 0.872, Ln T and (Ln 
2T) is -0.896, Ln T and (Ln L) (Ln T) is 0.981 and another 6 
correlations are higher than 0.880. If we compare the translog and 
the Cobb-Douglas production functions, these two models give similar 
adjusted R square, but the Cobb-Douglas give two more significant 
variables (Ln K and Ln T) and all coefficients are economically 
rational. Although the (Ln T) term in the translog form indicates 
the possibility of nonhomogeneous response, the negative coefficients 
for capital and labour are sufficient to reject the translog 
functional form. The high degree of multicollinearity in the translog 
form means the data do not allow us to adequately evaluate the function 
The Cobb-Douglas production function is preferred
to explain the technical relationship between input and output. 
Hence, the Cobb-Douglas will also be used for estimates of the profit
function.
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Table 4.1 Estimated the Cobb Douglas Production
Function for Paddy, Dry Season 1979
Variables Parameter Coefficient
with dummies no dummies
Constant Ln A 4.60786 
(5. 106)***)
5.37748
(6.513)***)
Ln L (Labour) aL 0. 15278 (1.637)*)
0.14030 
(1.553)
Ln K (Cash Capital) 6k 0.17532 
(2.608)***)
0.14286 
(2.205)**)
Ln T (Land operated) 0.50222
(4.336)***)
0.63953
(6.9978)***)
Tenurial Dummies:
DOO(Owner-operator) 6oo -0.05595(-0.499)
DRT(Renter) 6rt 0.04535(0.255)
Size Dummy:
DLS (Large-size) 6LS 0.17469 ( 1.034)
Location Dummies:
DL1 (Jati) 6i 0.2789
(1.837)*)
DL2 (Warga.) 62 0.19433 
(1.164)
DL3 (Mariuk) S3 0.30212
(1.6770)*)
?2 0.6394 0.62544
R 0.6204 0.61909
SB 0.6603 0.66140
F-Ratio 33.6895***) 98.5194***)
DF F(9, 171) F(3, 177)
***) Significant at 1%
**) Significant at 5%
*) Significant at 10%
Figure in the parentheses are t-value
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Table 4.2 Estimated Transcendental Production
Function for Paddy, Dry Season 1979
Variables Parameter Coefficient
Constant Ln A 4.39892***)
(3.637)
Ln L (Labour) aL 0.16565 (1.365)
Ln K (Cash Capital) 6K 0.16707*) (1.728)
Ln T (Land operated) Bt 0.41657***)(2.823)
L al -0.000061(-0.409)
K a2 0.0000006(0.133)
T «3 0.34035(1.165)
Tenurial Dummies:
DOO(owner-operator) 6oo -0.06511(-0.576)
DRT(renter) 6rt 0.05758(0.319)
Size Dummy:
DLS (large size) 6LS 0.09501(0.528)
Location Dummy:
DL1 (Jati) 51 0.29221*)
(1.897)
DL2 (Warga.) 52 0. 19181 
(1.136)
DL3 (Mariuk) «3 0.29981
(1.611)
2R 0.6433i2 0.61782
SE 0.6625
F-Ratio 25.24877***)
DF F(12, 168)
***) Significant at 1%
*) Significant at 10%
Figure in the parentheses are t-value
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Table 4.3 Estimated Translog Production Function
for Paddy, Dry Season 1979
Variable Parameter Coefficient
no dummies with dummies
Constant Ln A 12.89262 12.28901
(1.580) (1.503)
Ln L (Labour) “L -0.8434 -0.81039
(-0.738) (-0.688)
Ln K (Cash Captl.) 6k -0.63297 -0.61433
(-0.603) (-0.584)
Ln T (Land operated) ^T 2.6619 2.85058
(1.703)*) (1.810)*)
(Ln L)(Ln L) “l 0.00423 0.00572
(0.036) (0.048)
(Ln K)(Ln K) a2 0.01738 0.01079
(0.214) (0.234)
(Ln T) (Ln T) a3 0.34579 0.38674
(2.096)**) (2.243)**
(Ln L) (Ln K) a 4 0.08844 0.08548
(0.622) (0.593)
(Ln L) (Ln T) a5 -0. 14182 -0. 15795
(-1.136) (-1.240)
(Ln K) (Ln T) a6 -0.08372 -0.09821
(-0.768) (-0.889)
Tenurial Dummies: 6oo
D00(owner-operator) -0.04387
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DRT(renter)
Size Dummy:
rt
(-0.381)
0.07266
(0.406)
DLS (large-farm) !! -0.03016
(-0.154)
Location Dummies:
DL1 (Jati) 51 0.32140
(2.034)**)
DL2 (Warga.) 62 0.22903
(1.345)
DL3 (Mariuk) 53 0.34223
(1.835)*)
2R 0.64103 0.65401
i2 0.62213 0.62256
SE 0.65875 0.65838
F-Ratio 33.9285***) 20.79309***)
DF F(9, 171 ) F(15, 165)
***) Significant at 1%
**) Significant at 5%
*) Significant at 10% 
Figure in the parentheses are t-value
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4•3 Some Limitations of Production Function Approach
The three production functions are estimated by single equation 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) but they may suffer from problems of 
simultaneous equation bias and the problem of the assumption of 
perfect competition.
Let us take Cobb-Douglas production function for paddy 
production, then examine it to see the problems. It is assumed that a 
farmer is an entrepreneur who seeks to maximize profits. Profit is 
maximized subject to technical constraints imposed by the paddy 
production function (for a detailed discussion of the constraints 
imposed by the objective function, see Etherington, 1973,p.19 and 
Dillon,1979,p.44).
The farmer's objective can be written as 
II = PV - W1.L - W2.K - W3.T
subject to constraint of the technical production function
aL ®T 
V = A L K T
where W1, W2 and W3 are unit price of labour, capital, 
and land respectively. P is unit paddy price.
Price inputs and paddy are constant parameters because it 
assumed that the market is perfectly competitive for 
both inputs and output.
Suppose, the assumption is true, so the constrained profit 
function ( n ) is:
(4.4)
(4.5)
, aL ST
n = PV - (W1.L+ W2.K+ W3.T) + X [v - (A L R T ) (4.6:
then take first order derivatives for maximum profit:
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911 /9l § -W1 - A(a v/L) = o
L (4.6a)
9H /3k = -W2 - A(6k v/k) = o (4.6b)
dn'/gT I -W3 - X(6_ V/T) = 0
T (4.6c)
1 aL 3K 3
311 /3X = V - A L K T — 0 (4.6d)
9H/3v = P + X =0 (4.6e)
Substitute equation (4.6e) in where -P= X into equations 
(4.6a, 4.6b,and 4.6c), they become :
W1 = P ctL V/L (4.6f)
W2 = P Bk V/K (4.6g)
W3 = P ftp V/T (4.6h)
Then rearrange equations 4.6d, 4.6f, 4.6g,and 4.6h,
to become :
ai ST
V = A L LK XT T (4.6i)
l = (P/W1) a v (4.6 j )
K = (P/W2) V (4.6k)
T = (P/W3) 6t V (4.61)
When one assumes the first order conditions require a constant 
price of paddy and inputs (in the competitive market), this means that
all farms will operate in the same competitive market. Then all farms
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will use inputs at the same price ratio (W1/P, W2/P, and W3/P). As a
result, the sample will be scattered around one point. So one could
not estimate the production function by single equation methods-because 
such observations are not informative about the shape of the isoquant.
Taking natural logarithms of equations 4.6i-l, and 
using additive error terms:
( where the sample size is i =1,2,.... ,n)
(4.7a) 
(4.7b) 
(4.7c) 
(4.7d)l l
Ln V. = Ln A + OL Ln L. + P„Ln K. + P_Ln T. + u'.l L 1K1T1 a
Ln L. = Ln (P/W1) + Ln a.+ LnV. + u1.l l li
Ln Ki= Ln (P/W2) + Ln BR+ Ln + u2i
Ln T. = Ln (P/W3) + Ln B„+ Ln V. + u3.
From equations 4.7b,c,and d, the level of use factors K, L and T 
depends not only on the price of paddy and price of inputs (W) , but 
also on the error term in the production function. Hence, if one 
estimates the direct production function (4.7a), the assumption of 
independent u' does not hold any more, because u' depends on u1, u2 
and u3. Then the estimate of the production function becomes 
inconsistent because of simultaneous equations bias (Zellner,Kmenta 
and Drezer,1966)
Therefore a traditional direct production approach using the OLS 
may be subject to simultaneousequations bias resulting in inconsistent 
estimates as shown above. By contrast the profit function approach 
will give statistically consistent estimates because the specification 
of endogenous and exogenous variables are not mixed.
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Following Yotopoulos and Lau (1979,p.2) other advantages of the 
profit function approach are:
(1) it allows different firms to succeed to varying degrees in 
maximizing profit. It does not need to assume that all firms 
are profit maximising as in the direct production function 
approach.
(2) the supply and demand functions can be derived directly from 
the normalized profit function. In the production function 
approach the demand and supply functions are derived by 
solving for optimum use of inputs (i.e profit maximising 
levels of input use)
(3) It is possible to test different efficiency between groups by 
using a single normalized profit function. By contrast, in 
the direct production function approach, allocative 
efficiency differences are tested by separating the sample 
into 2 groups and estimating two production functions.
The purpose of this study is not to test for economic efficiency 
from the production function, but to use the profit function approach 
which is discussed in the following chapter.
CHAPTER V
PROFIT FUNCTION APPROACH
Testing economic efficiency using direct production function estimates 
has some shortcomings such as the assumption of the same inter firm
prices and technology, the assumption of perfect markets (i.e all
producers face the same market price of output and inputs) and
constant technology (implies the same technical efficiency for
individual farmers). Yotopoulos and Lau (1971) proposed an
alternative method to measure the relative economic efficiency from 
the profit function. Hie reasons are:
(a) Profit function approach compares economic efficiency among 
groups and allows inter-firm differences in the ability to 
equate the value marginal product of variable inputs to their 
prices. It also allows for differences in the price of the 
variable inputs between firms.
(b) Factor demand functions and production functions can be 
estimated jointly without explicit specification of the 
production function. It also does not need so much data 
(such as quantity of variable input), so that the data set is 
reduced.
(c) The specification of exogenous and endogeneous variables are 
not mixed, and so it gives statistically consistent
estimates.
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(d) In the short run situation, such as in agricultural 
applications,, one can treat one or more inputs such as land 
or capital as fixed factors.
(e) One can determine and test technical, price and economic 
efficiency parameters in the normalized profit function.
5.1 Profit Function Analysis
Take the production function of a firm
V = F(X  .... X. ;Z  .... Z. ) (5.1)1 i 1 j
where V is output
X is the i-th variable inputs (i=1,...m)
Z is the j-th fixed input ( j= 1........n)
The profit ( H ) is defined as total revenue (TR) minus total
variable cost (TVC). Fixed cost is not included in the profit 
because it does not affect the optimal (i.e profit maximizing) 
combination of the variable input So the profit ( R ) is
m
n' =P-F(X1..... Xm;Z;L..... Zm) Wi.Xi (5.2)
where P is unit price of output
W is the unit price of the i-th variable input 
The condition for a profit maximum is that the marginal value 
product of variable input (MVP^) is equal to its price. That is
P . 3(X;Z)/ 3Xi = Wi (5.3)
If the unit price of variable input (Wi) is divided by the 
unit price of output (P), it becomes ||gf W^/P. Then the
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equation (5.3) becomes;:
9 (X ,-Z )/9x.= W* (5.3a)l l
The optimal quantity of variable inputs (X^) is a function 
of the normalized price of the variable input and the quantity 
of the fixed input,
X* =f(W*,Z) (5.3b)l
where W and Z are denoted as vectors 
If the equations(5.3a) and (5.3b) are substituted in equation 
(5.2), we get the profit function which gives the maximum 
value of the profit for each set of unit price of output 
and price of variable inputs:
, m
II* i P.[ F(X*,---X*;Z ,--- Z ) - I W*. X.] (5.4)
i ml n i 1
= P. G*(W*, . . . ,W*;Z ,.... Z ) (5.4a)
*
Then, the Unit Output Price (UOP) profit function (II ) is 
written as
tt* I tt /P = G (W ,....W;Z,....Z) (5.5)
n n 1 m l n
In the right hand side of the UOP profit function there are only 
the normalized price of variable inputs and fixed factors.
Hence the UOP profit function ( II ) expresses the maximized
profit of a farm as a function of the unit price of
the variable inputs which are normalized by price of the output,
and the fixed factors of production (for a given technology 
and a given endowment of fixed factors of production),
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Lau and Yotopoulos (1972,p.11).
From the equation (5.5), one can solve the Factor Demand function 
(X^ ) and Output Supply function (Y* ) which are given 
respectively as
X* = -3G*(W*; Z )/9W* (5.6)
and
j^ jj jj ^ j^ Jr Jr Jr
Y = G (W ; Z ) - £ W. . 9G (W ; Z ) /9W. (5.7)■ 1
The properties of the Unit Output Price (UOP) profit function are
summarized by Kalirajan (1979) as follows:
"(i) There exists a one to one correspondence between the set of 
concave production functions and the set of convex profit 
functions. (ii) Every concave production function has a dual 
which is a convex profit function. (iii) The profit function 
estimates of the production parameter are more efficient than 
estimates obtained from a direct production function. (iv) 
Shephard's lemma enables us to derive factor demand functions of 
variable inputs and the supply function from the UOP profit 
function. (v) The UOP profit function is decreasing in the 
normalized prices of variable inputs and increasing in the fixed 
factors of production" (Kalirajan, 1979,p.102).
5.2 Hypothesis Testing.
The farms can be put into several groups:
(1) according to different tenure status: owner-operator, renter, and 
sharecropper
(2) according to farm sizes: small and large •
Then each group is tested in terms of relative technical, price 
and economic efficiency. Consider two groups of the firms to be 
tested. The production functions for each group are as follows:
V1= A1F(X1,Z1) and o')')') V = AZF(X ,Zz) (5.8)
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where V is the production
A is technical efficiency parameter 
X is the vector of variable inputs 
Z is the vector of fixed inputs
If A-*->A^ , the group 1 is more technically efficient than group 2. 
1 2If A = A the two groups are equally technically efficient.
It is assumed that there are no inter-firm differences in 
technical efficiency within a group.
The marginal condition for testing price efficiency for two groups, 
assuming that they face different input prices:
3a1F(X,Z)/3x^= kjWj1 (5.9)
3A2F(x,z)/3x2= k2w*2 (5.10)
3 3 3
where k1 = managerial enterpreneurial ability > 0
j
i = 1, 2
j = 1 / • • • Itl
*1W = normalize prices
j
Xf k^= k2the two group are equally price efficient with respect
j j
to all variable inputs for all j.
As mentioned earlier, economic efficiency is the combination of
both technical and price efficiency. The two groups are equal
12 1_ 2in relative economic efficiency if and only if A =A and k -k..
3 3 3 3
In the production function and the UOP profit function
V = A F(X,Z), and
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n* = A G* (k_.W*; Z) (5.11)
A
, *where k,W may be interpreted as the effective prices.
Then the Factor Demand function is
X.a"= - a"8g (k1 .W 1;Z)/9kTw.' 
A1
l ma
where i= 1,2
dctk^wA1 ;Z)
A1/k. (5. 12)
mi
3
and the Supply Function is
*i i * i *2- l i V. = A G (k .W /A ; Z ) 1
i
l , l l,9G (k .W /A ; Z )
ml vA Z 1*1
j=1 i 1 
9k W.3 3
. k.. W. 3 3
* j_ i i9G (k .W /A ; Z )
i * i *i i i = A G (k .W /A ; Z ) -
• m * 
A E W. 
3=1 3
(5. 13)
9 w.' 3
Hie profit function is
n = V - E w.1 x.1 
3=1 3 3 *i * i *i i(1-kt)Wj 9G (k .W /A ;Z )
i ** i *i i x i = A G (k .W /A ; Z ) + A (5. 14)
9W1
3
From the UOP profit function, one can test the joint hypotheses
that A1=A2 and k1=k2 are equal in relative economic efficiency
between two groups. If Ho is accepted, the actual UOP profit 
function of the two groups coincide with each other (Yotopoulos 
and Lau,1971,p. 100 ) .
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5.3 The Cobb Douglas Profit Function
The Cobb-Douglas production function has decreasing returns to scale in 
the variable input (Labour), while cash capital (K) and land (T) are fixed 
factors. In the short run situation, cash capital and land cannot be 
variable. Then, the profit is the total revenue less total variable cost.
Rewrite the production function (equation 4.5) as
aTV = A L LK KT 1
The UOP profit function for this production function (for more
detail of the approach is shown by Lau and Yotopoulos,1972,p13) 
is given by:
-1 -1 -1eTu-s)
(5.15)K T
A W
fl I 3T 
K T (5.15a)
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* (1-s) a ^Where A = Av ' (1-s) ct L
-1
(5.15b)
a. -a (l-s) -l < o (5.15c)
K 6k (1-s) > 0 (5.15d)
*I
T @T (1-s) > 0
(5.15e)
a < 0 L (5.15f)
Where s = a <1, s is the sum of elasticities of variables inputs,
in this case only a (Yotopoulos and Lau,1973,p.216)
Taking natural logarithms of equations 5.15a becomes:
In II* = Ln A +a LnW +8K LnK + $T LnT (5.15g)
The labour demand function which is given by the Shephard's lemma
(Yotopoulos and lau,1979,p.4) is as follows:
xj* = - 9H*/9w* (5.16)
* *
For the Cobb-Douglas profit function X = a
From the above equations one has to distinquish between the
elasticity of output with respect to variable and fixed inputs,i.e
*
a # £ f g and the parameters of the profit funtion, i.e ,
o* o* . Hence, from the UOP profit function equation (5.15) and 
PK ' T
(5.15a-f) we can derive indirectly the production function of the 
equation (4.5). The equation (5.l5g) can be estimated using the
methods shown in chapter 6•
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5.4 Translog Profit Function
The translog profit function will be compared with the Cobb 
Douglas profit function, to see whether the translog profit function 
is more suitable than the Cobb-Douglas for the data or not. Following 
Sidhu and Baanante(1981,p.237-40) the translog profit function and 
labour demand functions are estimated as follows:
1. Translog profit function is
* * * Jc jc *
In II = a + aT Ln W + 1/26TT(Ln W ) (Ln W ) + $ (Ln W ) (Ln T) +O L XjLi XjT
$LK (Ln W*)(Ln K) + @* Ln T + Ln K + 1/2<J>TT(Ln T)2 +
1/2^KK(Ln K)2 + ^TK(Ln K)(Ln T) + u1 (5.17)
2. Labour demand function is
-W*L/H* = a +6 Ln W + 5„m Ln K + 6mir Ln T + u2 (5.18)
' 1 LL KT TK
The translog profit function can be simplified to the Cobb-Douglas if 
the coefficients of all second order terms in equation 5.17 are zero. 
The null hypothesis for the translog profit function to be
Cobb-Douglas is Ho: 1 /26LL=$LT=$LK= 1 /2(fTT= 1 /2<f>KK=<t,TK=° * ^ results 
of the test are reported in chapter 6.
CHAPTER VI
ECONOMETRIC ESTIMATION
In using the profit function, we require adequate variation in paddy 
price and factor price (wages) data. In perfect markets, all farmers 
would face the same input and output prices. But here it is assumed 
that transport costs and transactions costs of middlemen give adequate 
variation in the price data for estimation purposes. However, if the 
cross section data come from a small region, such as one village, the 
data on prices may show little variability (Binswanger 1975,p.41).
All the data of four villages are pooled for estimation purposes. 
Before pooling, the profit function was tested with the Chow-Test in 
order to determine whether these estimates differ significantly across 
the four villages. According to the test, the alternative hypotheses 
is accepted at the 1 per cent significant level (Table 6.1). This 
means that a location dummy has to be included in the function in 
order to catch the shift in the intercept terms of the profit
functions.
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Table 6.1 Chow-Test of the UOP Profit Function a) 
for Different Villages
Cases
RSS
(Residual Sum
of Squares)
No. of
explanatory
variables (K)
F-Statistics
D.F (K,n1+n2+
n3+n4-4K)
Pooled Data(p) 229 483.98546 4
Vill.Jati (j) 74(n1) 51.28770 4
Vill.Warga(w) 67(n2) 195.53083 4 F* =5.45772 b)
Vill.Mari (m) 41(n3) 90.70893 4 Significant
Vill.Suka (s) 47(n4) 101.46466 4 at 1 % c)
* * * * * *a) the function is II = LnA + a LnW + 3^ In K + hi T
b) See Koutsoyiannis,(1979.p.166)
(RSS -RSS•-RSS -RSS - RSS„)/K ' p i w m s"F* --------------------------------------
(RSSj +RSSw+RSSm+RSSs)/(n1+n2+n3+n4-4K)
c) Tabulated F4, rv ( 0.01 )=3.32
6.1 UOP Profit Function for All Farmers
The UOP profit and labour demand functions for all samples with 
dummies for location are rewritten as:
Ln II*= Ln A*+ S*D00 + 6*DRT + 6*DLS + 6 DL1 + 6 DL2 + 6 DL3 +
oo rt LS 1 z J
a* Ln W*+ g* Ln K + g* Ln T + u1 (6.1)
* * * 1-w x l/H = aL + u2 (6.2)
Where:
* ,II 1S UOP profit per farm equals total paddy production multiplied 
by its price (farm gate price at harvest time) minus total 
pre-harvest labour both family and hired labour (in hours) 
multiplied by wages of pre harvesting labour.
Then the actual profit is normalized by unit price of paddy (P)
Di is dummy 1 for farm greater or equal to 0.5 hectare is defined 
a large farm(DIS)• While a small farm(DSS) is defined as 
farm size less then 0.5 hectare (i= LS,SS)
Dj is dummy for tenure status (j=00,RT,SC),
owner-operator(00), renter(RT), and sharecropper(SC) respectively
DLi is dummy variable for village location(i=1,2,3) :DL1, DL2, DL3 
for village Jati, Wargabinangun and Mariuk respectively.
*W is wages per hr.(w) of pre harvesting labour , normalized 
by unit paddy price (P).
K is cash capital in rupiah per farm and includes the value 
value of seed, fertilizer, pesticide, water and animal power.
T is crop area planted per farm in dry season of 1979 (in hectares)
L is preharvesting labour in hours
u is stochastic error term with the usual properties.
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According to Lau and Yotopoulos (1972,p15) both functions have to
be estimated jointly in order to get more efficient estimates of
coefficients (lower standard error) as well as imposing restrictions 
* * * * *
that aL = 'or g^ + g^ =1; or both if it is appropriate. Based on 
the UOP profit and labour demand functions (equation 6.1 and 6.2), we 
can derive the response elasticities for the output supply and labour 
demand functions to the predetermined variables i.e. rice price,wages 
and quantity of fixed factors (Tamin,1979,p.90)
1.Supply response function;
•ff ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Ln Y = Ln( 1 - a)+LnA+aLnW + g LnK + g LnT - a Ln P (6.3) S L L K T L
From the function, one can get elasticity of response with respect to
* *
a) price : Bin Yg /9Ln P = -a^
* *
b) wages ; 9 In Y /9Ln W =
* *c) fixed factor K : 9 Ln Y_ /9Ln K = 6S Jx
* *
d) fixed factor T : 9 In Y^ /3Ln T = 8,^
Where P and W are nominal prices.
2. Labour demand function;
Ln X*= Ln(- a ) + Ln A + (a* - 1)LnW+ g LnK+ g LnT+(1- a )LnP (6.4)
L L L K T L
The labour demand elasticity with respect to
* *
a) price : 9In X /9LnP =(1- 01^)
* *
b) wages : 3ln X^ /3l*nW =(ajj ~1)
* *
c) fixed factor K : 8In X^ /dLn K =
* *d) fixed factor T ; 3 In X^ /3Ln T = 8T
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6.1.1 Functional Form of UOP profit functions
The null hypothesis of translog profit function to be 
approximated by the Cobb-Douglas profit function is rejected at the 1 
per cent significance level. The computed F (6,140)=3.926 exceeds the 
critical F 0.01=2.80 as shown in Appendix 6.1. The profit functions 
are estimated by OLS using equation 5.15g for the Cobb-Douglas and 
equation 5.17 for the translog. Both forms have correct signs and the 
translog has better goodness of fit as indicated by the adjusted R 
square. It has lower SEE and a greater number of significant 
coefficients. The translog form generally gives better statistical 
results than the Cobb-Douglas. However, the magnitudes of the 
translog coefficients are not comparable with the corresponding 
Cobb-Douglas coefficients because the translog profit function has no 
corresponding production function. The only remaining way is to 
compare the reduced form elasticities for each functional form. Since 
the Cobb-Douglas meets all the statistical and economic requirements, 
we shall use the Cobb-Douglas profit function results even though the 
translog results may be superior in some sense. The major reason is 
that tests for relative economic efficiency are well developed for the 
Cobb-Douglas form but not for the translog form. Hence the results 
need to be interpreted with some caution.
6.1.2 Results of Cobb-Douglas Profit Function
The equations6. 1 and 6.2 are estimated jointly either by OLS or 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SURE) with and without restrictions as
presented in Table 6.2.
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Table 6.2 Joint Estimation of Cobb-Douglas
Profit and Labour Demand Functions
Parameter
Single
Equation
OLS
( 1 )
Unrestricted
(2)
SURE
Restricted * *'
a = aL L
(3)
Restricted
6* + B*=1
K T
(4)
Restricted* * i
a = a
e* + $*=i
K (5)T
1.UOP Profit Function:
*In A 5.6805 6.0241 5.6586 6.2003 5.8278
(0.85683)***) (0.64612)*** ) (0.64164)*** ) (0.64225)***) (0.63736)***)
*
6ls 0.02287 0. 14692 0. 18835 -0.11659 -0.054226
(0. 19257) (0.14497) ( 0. 14472) (0.099355) (0.098469)
*
8 -0.231 14 -0. 18926 -0. 19305 -0.23445 -0.23443OO
(0. 13087)*) (0.09852)*) (0.09852)*) (0.09684)**) (0.09684)**)
*
8rt 0.00899 -0.11828 -0.17417 -0. 11450 -0. 16951
(0. 19559) (0.14725) (0. 14679) (0. 14724) (0. 14677)
51 0.50787 0.22419 0.27373 0. 16965 0•22267
(0. 18201)***) (0.13702) (0. 13664)**) ( 0. 13527) (0. 13480)*)
52 0.23354 0.04473 0.21293 -0.06470 0. 10905
(0.20318) (0.15296) (0. 14892)*) (0.14654) (0.14182)
63 0.47652 0.05995 0.29025 -0.00291 0.22779
(0.22751)**) (0.17128) (0. 16446)*) (0. 16942) (0.16218)
*
% -0.31033 0.01288 -0.38573 -0.00455 -0.39342
(0.15263)**) (0.11491) (0.07966)*** ) (0. 11469) (0.079589)***)
6*
K
0.74782 0.68056 0.66821 0.85449 0.82802
(0 . 12030 )***) (0.090564)*** ) (0.090527)*** )(0.057843)*** )(0.057569)***)
6* 0.1425 0. 12314 0. 15207 0. 14551 0.17198
T
(0.07775)*) (0.058533)**) (0.058224)*** ) (0.057843)**) (0.057569)***)
2.labour Demand Function :
a*' -0.75459 -0.75459 -0.38573 -0.75459 -0.39342L
(0.1105)***) (0.11053)***) (0.07965)*** (0.11053)***) (0.079589)***)
Figure in parentheses are standard error. * Significant at 10% level; 
** Sianificant at 5% level; *** Significant at 1% level.
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Testing of profit maximisation and constant returns to scale for the 
whole sample is done by unrestricted SURE. Hypothesis of profit
* * Imaximisation is done by testing the null hypothesis (H^ : ).
The computed F =23.170 is higher than critical F 0.01=6.63, so the 
null hypothesis is rejected at 1 per cent significance level (Table 
6.3). This means that the farmers do not succeed in maximising profit.
Table 6.3 Statistical Hypotheses Tested
Tested Hypothesis Computed F Critical
F 0.05 F 0.01
1.Profit maximi-
sation F(1,301)=23.170 F( 1,0/ ) =3.84 F(1,% )=6.63
2.Constant return
to scale F( 1,301 )=6.230 > M
1 
u>
1 
00
1 
£> F( 1 ,V ) =6.63
The hypothesis of constant returns to scale is tested from the
* *sum of coefficients of fixed factors ( Ho: $ + 3 = 1) as show by IauK T
and Yotopoulos (1972,p. 16). The computed F=6.23 is higher than
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critical F 0.05 = 3.84 which indicates that the null hyphothesis is 
rejected at the 5 per cent significance level. Hence, the constant 
returns model is rejected because of the rejected F-test and 
because W* is not significantly different from zero (see Table 6.2). 
Since the sum of the coefficients of the fixed factors is less than 
one, decreasing returns to scale is implied.
The models of the UOP profit function with restrictions (columns
3,4 and 5) are not used, although they are presented in the Table 6.2. 
The restrictions on the UOP profit function are rejected and so are 
these results. The profit function from unrestricted SURE is also not 
used because the coefficient of W*is not significant and has incorrect 
sign.
The UOP profit function estimated by OLS is the preferred model 
because all of important variables such as normalized wage (VI*), cash 
capital (K) and land (T) are significant at least at 10 per cent 
significance level. Other reasons are the error term (u1 of equation 
6.1) is tested by Durbin Watson test in order to know whether serial 
correlation of the disturbances is present or not. The null 
hypothesis of no autocorrelation (Ho:d =2) cannot be rejected at the 5 
per cent significant level (Koutsoyiannis, 1979,pp.212-14), since dy = 
1.608 < d =1.704 < 4 - <^=2.392 for n =150, k=10 as shown by Judge 
et.al ( 1982,p•790 ) . Multicollinearity of the function does not seem 
to be a serious problem, since the elements of the correlation matrix 
are all lower than 0.67. Hence, the OLS coefficients (column 1 of 
Table 6.2) will be used for further analysis such as to derive ouput
supply functions.
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6.1.3 Output Supply and Labour Demand Elasticity
Supply response is defined as the output response to changing of 
the own price, price of inputs, and other product prices (Tomek and 
Robinson,1972,p.71). The output supply elasticity with respect to own 
price, wages and quantity of fixed factors (land and cash capital) can 
be derived from the UOP profit function using equation 6.3 (column 1 
of Thble 6.2). The reported elasticities come from the whole sample.
The elasticity of paddy with respect to own price is inelastic 
(0.31) as shown in Thble 6.4. The positive sign of the price 
elasticity means that the farmers output produced responds positively 
to increases in paddy price. For every 10 per cent increase in the 
relative price of paddy, production will increase by 3.1 per cent. 
Mubyarto (1965, p. 102) reported that the supply elasticity of rice of 
0.203 for the wet season betwen 1951 and 1962 in Java and Madura. It 
seems that the price response behaviour has not changed much after 20 
years. Even though the price response is relatively low (0.31), the 
output price policy may still have some effect on strategy to increase 
paddy production and responsiveness of output to price has increased 
slightly in recent years.
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Table 6.4 Computed Elasticities of Output 
Supply and Labour Demand
Ln P Ln W Ln K Ln T
1•Output Supply:
*
m Ys 0.3103 -0.3103 0. 1425 0.7478
2.labour Demand:
*In X
L 1.3103 -1.3103 0.1425 0.7478
The output price elasticity of labour demand is 1.31 (Table 6.4). 
This indicates that demand for labour is strongly influenced by output 
price. Hence for a 10 per cent increase in paddy price, the quantity of 
labour demanded will increase by 13 per cent. Thus output price policy 
has a positive effect on labour absorption in rural areas of West 
Java.
The output response with respect to land is relatively high 
(0.75), while cash capital is relatively low (0.1425) as shown in 
Thble 6-4. This indicates that land is an important source to 
increase paddy supply. For every 10 per cent increase in area of 
paddy planted, the paddy supply will increase by 7.5 per cent.
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6.1.4 Elasticity of production
The direct and indirect estimates of elasticity of paddy 
production with respect to inputs are presented in Table 6.5. The 
indirect estimates of the production elasticities are not stricly 
comparable to the direct estimation elasticities, because the latter 
may be inconsistent due to simultaneous equation bias. By contrast, 
the indirect estimation of production elasticities are statistically 
consistent and efficient given the error term assumptions. So the 
indirect elasticities will be used for further analysis.
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Table 6.5 Indirect and Direct Estimation of 
Production Elasticity
Indirect a) Direct
Labour aL 0.2368 0.1528
Cash Cap . 6K 0.1088 0. 1753
Land 3T 0.5707 0.5022
Sum (01^+3 +3 )K T 0.9163 0.8303
a)Calculated from Table 6.2 (column 1), 
using equations 5.15a,b,c,d,e,and f.
All of the individual elasticities of output with respect to 
input are less then one (labour is 0.24, cash capital is 0.11 and land 
is 0.57) as presented in Table 6.5. This indicates diminishing 
marginal returns to each input. If land and cash capital are held 
constant, the extra paddy obtainable from successive increments of 
labour as variable input will decline.
land is the most important factor for increasing paddy 
production, since output elasticity with respect to land is the 
highest of all of the production factors. By contrast, the cash 
capital is less important as a source of increased production.
The sum of the individual elasticity of output with respect to 
inputs is 0.92. If a farmer simultaneously increases inputs 
(labour as well as land and cash capital) by 10 per cent, then paddy 
production will increase by 9 per cent. The hypothesis of constant
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6.2 Testing of Hypotheses between Groups
The UOP profit function will be used to test efficiency and 
profit maximisation among different groups such as owner-operator 
versus sharecropper, owner-operator versus renter, sharecropper versus 
renter, and large size farmer versus small size farmer. The UOP 
profit and labour demand functions of each group for estimation 
purposes are written as :
1. Owner-operator versus sharecropper;
returns to scale was clearly rejected at the 5 per cent level of
significance as has already been shown in Table 6.3.
a) Ln H*=Ln A*+ 6*D00 + 6 DL1 + 6 DL2 + 6 DL3 + a Ln W +
oo 1 2 3 L
* *8 Ln K +8 Ln T + u1 K T
* * *2
b) -W: L/II = 6 D00 + 8 DSC + u2oo sc
(6.5)
(6.6)
2. Owner-operator versus renter;
a) Ln H*=Ln A + 6 D00 + S DL1 + 5 DL2 + <5 DL3 + a Ln W +
OO
***-*- *2 
b) -W...JVII = 6oqD00 + SrtDRT + u4
L
8*Ln K + 8,pLn T + u3 (6.7)
(6.8)
3. Sharecropper versus renter;
a) Ln II*=Ln A*+ 6sDSC + S^DLI + 6-)DL2 + S^DLS + Ot^Ln W +
b)
* * *1 .*2 
-VI .h/ II = 6scDSC + OrtDRT + u6
Ln K + 8 ^ T+u5 
'K T
(6.9)
(6.10)
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4. Snail versus large farm size;
* * * k k
a) Ln II =Ln A + 6 DLS + 6 DL1 + 6 DL2 + 6 DL3 + OL-Ln W +
LS 1 2 3 L
6 Ln K + B*Ln T + u7 (6.11)
12 K L
b) -W:*L/H'"" = 8 DLS + 6 DSS + u8LS SS (6.12)
The UOP profit and labour demand functions each group are estimated 
jointly by OLS and SURE. The results of estimation are shown in the 
appendices (6.2,6.3,6.4 and 6.5). Our concern here is not to discuss 
specific coefficient results, but to test the hypotheses which
are discussed in the following section.
The following hypotheses are tested;
(1) Testing relative economic efficiency:
a) equal relative economic efficiency between owner-operator and
*
sharecropper (equation 6.5) is Ho: 6 = 0
b) equal relative economic efficiency between owner-operator and
*
renter (equation 6.7) is Ho: 6 =0oo
c) equal relative economic efficiency between sharecropper and
x*renter (equation 6.9) is Ho: 0^=0
d) equal relative economic efficiency between large and small
*
size (equation 6.11) is Ho: 8^g = 0
(2) Testing relative price (allocative) efficiency:
a) equal relative price efficiency between owner—operator and
*1 *2
sharecropper (equation 6.6) is Ho: 8^ &sc
b) equal relative price efficiency between owner-operator and
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*! *2
renter (equation 6.8) is Ho: oo = sc 
c) equal relative price efficiency between sharecropper andJj ■
renter (equation 6.10) is Ho: o
d) equal relative price efficiency between small and large size
*1 *2
(equation 6.12) is Ho: § = 5LS SS
(3) Relative technical efficiency:
The joint hypotheses of relative economic efficiency and 
price efficiency.
a) equal in relative technical efficiency between owner-operator
and sharecropper (equations 6.5 and 6.6) is Ho: 8 =0, and
■ *2
6=6 OO sc
b) equal in relative technical efficiency between owner-operator* d
and renter (equations 6.7 and 6.8) is Ho: 6 = 0, and 8 =K oo oo*2
6rt
c) equal in relative technical efficiency between sharecropper
1
sc
* *
and renter (equations 6.9 and 6.10) is Ho: 6gc = 0, and 6 
*2
= 6rt
d) equal in relative technical efficiency between small and large
* * *
size (equation 6.11 and 6.12) is Ho: S^g = 0> and S^g= Sgg
(4) Testing for absolute price efficiency:
a) profit maximisation for owner-owner operator is Ho: oo
[equations 6.5 and 6.6) or 8qo — 0tT (equations 6.7 and= aL
6.8)
b) Profit maximisation for sharecropper is Ho:
.1 sc
a
(equations 6.5 and 6.6) or 6 = a (equations 6.9 and 6.10)
c) Profit maximisation for renter is Ho:
* *6 = art L
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(equations 6.7 and 6.8) or
*
(equations 6.9 and
6. 10)
d) Profit maximisation for small size farmer is Ho: 
*
CL (equations 6.11 and 6.12)
e) Profit maximisation for large size farmer is Ho:
*
(equation 6.11 and 6.12)
The hypotheses which will be discussed below, are tested by 
unrestricted SURE. The F-test is conducted to test the null 
hypotheses.
6.2.1 Economic Efficiency
The relative economic efficiency between two groups is expected 
to be the same for a given equal access to inputs and technology. The 
results of testing for equal relative economic efficiency can be seen 
in row 1 of Tables 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. The null hypotheses of 
equal relative economic efficiency between owner-operator and 
sharecropper, or owner-operator and renter, or sharecropper and 
renter, or small and large size groups cannot be rejected at 95 per 
cent level of significance. None of dummy variable of D00 (equation 
6.5), DOO (equation 6.7), DSC (equation 6.9) and DLS (equation 6.11) 
are different from zero at the 95% level of significance. Thus we 
can conclude that all the farmers have equal relative economic 
efficiency in dry season 1979 regardless of tenure status and farm
size.
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The next step is to examine whether the two groups have equal 
relative price and technical efficiencies. The testing of hypotheses 
of equal relative price efficiency can be seen in row 2 of Table 6.6, 
6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. The null hypotheses of equal relative price
efficiency between owner-operator and sharecropper, or owner-operator 
and renter, or sharecropper and renter groups are accepted at 95 per 
cent level of significance (computed F is lower than critical F).
The null hypotheses of equal relative price efficiency between 
small and large size farmers cannot be rejected at the 95 per cent 
significance level (computed F=0.093 < critical F(0.05)=3.84). This 
means that both groups have equal relative price efficiency.
The same conclusions are reached by testing null hypotheses of
equal technical efficiency between two groups; owner-operator and
sharecropper, or owner-operator and renter, or sharecropper and
renter, or small size and large size farmer. The results are shown in
row 3 of Table 6.6, 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9. From these results it is
concluded that all farmers have equal relative price efficiency, and
equal relative technical efficiency regardless of tenure status and farm 
size.
6.2.2 Profit maximisation
Testing for the presence of profit maximisation behaviour 
requires that a group of farmers should equate the marginal value 
product of labour to the wages paid. It can be shown (Lau and 
Yotopoulos, 1973) that this is equivalent to testing the null hypothesis 
that the coefficient of normalized wage (W ) from the profit function 
is equal to the dummy variable from labour demand function.
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the computed-F (F =18.947 or F=22.606) are greater than the critical F 
0.01=6.63. This means that the null hypotheses is rejected at 99 per 
cent level significance. We conclude that owner-operators do not 
behave as entrepreneurs vho seek maximum profits.
For sharecroppers, profit maximisation can be tested by the 
hypotheses given in row 5 of Table 6.6 and row 4 of Table 6.8 (the 
computed F=10.243 and F=5.668). The first hypothesis is rejected at 1 
per cent significance level, while the second is rejected at 5 per 
cent level of significance. So we conclude that the sharecroppers do 
not maximise profits.
For renters,the profit maximisation test can be seen in row 5 of 
Table 6.7 and Table 6.8. Computed F =3.123 or 0.979 which is less 
than the critical F(0.05)=3.84. This means that the null hypotheses 
cannot be rejected at the 95 per cent level, of significance. This 
implies that the renting farmer behaves as an entreprenuer who seeks 
maximum profit.
The computed F for small size group of farmers (in row 5 of Table 
6.9) is 21.890; and for the large size (in row 4 of Table 6.9) is 
20.630. These test results indicate that both null hypotheses are 
rejected at 99 percent level of significance. This implies that 
neither small size nor large size groups of farmers maximize profits.
For owner-operators, profit maximisation can be tested by the
hypotheses given in row 4 of Tables 6.6 and 6.7. Both values of
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Table 6.6 Testing Hypotheses: Relative Economic, Price and 
Technical Efficiency; and Profit Maximisation 
for Owner-operator and Sharecropper
Hypotheses Computed F
Critical F
F 0.05 F 0.01
*
1. 6 = oo 
*i
0
*2
F(1,260)=3.528 F( 1A )=3.84 F( 1,% )=6.63
2. 6 1 oo 6sc F(1,260)=0.493 FXifl 00roII F( 1,% )=6.63
*
3. 6 = oo 0 ,
*1 *2
6 = oo 6sc F(2,260)=1.962 F(2 A )=3.00 F( 1A )=4.61
4. p. * 1°oo= a* F(1,260)=18.947 F( 1 A )=3•84 F( 1A )=6.63
5. s*2=sc *aL F(1,260)=10.263 F( 1,^ )=3•84 F( 1,^ )=6.63
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Table 6.7 Test of Hypotheses: Relative Economic, Price
and Technical Efficiency, and Profit Maximisation 
for Owner-operator and Renter
Critical F
Hypotheses Computed F
F 0.05 F 0.01
*
1.6 a 0 F( 1,186)= 1. 126oo
*1 *22.6 = F( 1,186)=1. 260oo rt
*
3.6 = 0,oo
*1 *2
5oo= 6rt F( 2,186)=0. 772
*1 *4. 6 =oo aL F( 1,186)=22 .606
2
5.6* = a F( 1,186)=3• 123rt L
F( 1, c? II Ul .84 F( 1,'| )=6.63
F( 1,
mII .84 |( i,i )=6•63
F(2, ^ )= 3.00 F( 1,^ II
F( 1,
00COII<? F( 1,.* )=6.63
F( 1, % )= 3.84 F( 1,% )=6.63
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Table 6.8 Test of Hypotheses: Relative Economic, Price
and Technical Effiency; and Profit Maximisation 
for Sharecropper and Renter
Hypoteses Computed F
Critical F
F 0.05 F 0.01
*
1. 6 = sc 0 F(1,146)=0.068 F( 1, >)=3.84 F( 1 A )=6.63
2. S* = sc
6*2
rt F(1,148)=0.566
COcoII7ST F( 1 A )=6.63
3. s*= 0,sc
r*l r*26 = sc 6 . rt F(2,148)=0.881 F(2> ) =3.00 F(2A )=4.61
„*i *4. 6 = sc aL F(1, 148)=5.668 F(1,^ )=3.84 F( 1 A )=6.63
p* 2 *5. 6 = a F(1,148)=0.979 F(1 A )=3.84 F ( 1 A )=6.63rt L
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Table 6.9 Test of Hypotheses: Relative Economic, Price and 
Technical Efficiency, and Profit Maximisation 
for Small and Large Size Groups
Hypotheses Computed F
Critical F
F 0.05 F 0.01
1. *6 = LS 0 F(1,396)=0.221 f( T to 00 F( 1,^ )=6.63
2. £- p*25ss F ( 1,396)=0.093 F( 1,% )=3.84 F( 1,% )=6.63
3. ■ - o,
P*1.
°LS
p*2“ss F( 2,396)=0.292 F(2,^ )=3.00 F(2,^ )=4.61
4. °LS ~ *«L F(1,396)=20.630 F( 1,% )=3.84 F( 1,% )=6.63
5. r* 26ss 1 *1 F(1,396)=21.988 it 1,0 )=3.84 ?|.1,| )=6.63
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
7.1 Summary
The study of the role of tenancy in paddy production is very 
important, since tenancy may affect the performance of rice
intensification programs through which the government intends to 
increase paddy production. The Agriculture Department has proposed 
that tenure status is one of the 12 factors responsible for the 
shortfall in the target yield of paddy. The Department of Agriculture 
assumes that tenant farmers may not have the same incentives as 
owner-operators to participate in the intensification programs and to 
increase production.
The present study attempts to answer the above question by 
testing the effect of tenure status and farm size on allocative 
efficiency in rice production. If tenure status and farm size do not 
affect allocative efficiency, there would be the possibility of 
simultaneously increasing output and improving the distribution of 
income. If such a possibility were to be established, then a wider 
range of equity based policy options can be proposed for Indonesia.
The methodology used to test for the presence of economic 
efficiency is through the profit function approach rather than direct 
production function or linear programming approaches. The direct 
production function approach may cause biased results, while the 
linear programming approach suffers from the lack of statistical 
measures of significance and goodness of fit. The unit output price 
(UOP) profit function is a more powerful technique for testing
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allocative efficiency hypotheses. In this study the profit and labour 
demand functions are estimated jointly by OLS and SURE (both with and 
without restrictions).
A sample of two hundred and twenty nine paddy farmers located in 
4 villages of West Java is used in this study. All of them used high 
yielding varieties and had access to irrigation either in dry season 
1979 or wet season 1978/79. The data are from research done by Rural 
Dynamics Study of Agro-Economic Survey (AES) in 1980.
7.2 Conclusion and Implications
Farm size and tenure status do not significantly affect 
efficiency of resource allocation in paddy production in West Java, at 
least in the villages of the study. This indicates that, in the dry 
season of 1979 all sample farmers appear to have approximately equal 
access to inputs regardless of farm size or tenure status.
Neither sharecropper nor owner-operator employ the variable input 
(labour) under marginal principles in order to reach maximum profits. 
Profit maximising behaviour is rejected for both sharecroppers and 
owner-operators, but is supported for renters.
The study does not seem to support the Marshallian theory to 
explain the behaviour of sharecroppers to use less labour than 
owner-operators. It also shows that paddy production under 
sharecropping arrangement will not necessarily be less than production 
under owner-operator. But since (except for renters) no group maximises 
profits, the findings do not lend particular support to the Chicago
School's view.
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The results also imply that tenure status is not a constraint to 
increased paddy production, since the owner-operator, renter and 
sharecropper have already allocated their resources with equal 
efficiency. Hence, the government cannot necessarily expect to 
substantially increase or reduce paddy production through tenancy 
reform. However tenancy reform might reduce the oligopsonistic 
power in the land market. The reform could restrict the transfer of 
operating control over agricultural land from the poor to the rich.
The implication of small and large farms having equal economic 
efficiency is that if the government redistributed the land to the 
minimum of 0.5 hectare (the minimum size of the Agrarian Law of 
1960 is 2 hectares), then there would not be substantial efficiency 
losses or gains, but there would probably be improvements in income 
equality.
Even though the paddy price response is relatively low, output 
price policy will still have some positive effect on the government's 
strategy to increase paddy supply. The demand for labour is strongly 
influenced by output price, which implies that paddy price policy has 
a positive effect on labour absorption in the agricultural sector.
This effect would be partially offset by the low elasticity of output 
with respect to labour.
Land is the important source of increasing paddy supply. Because 
no more land is available in the villages, the output can be increased 
by increasing the productivity of land by such means as better water 
control or breeding improved varieties. Alternatively the available 
land has to be allocated more to paddy rather than alternative crops.
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Appendix 2.1 Profit Maximum for Owner, Renter and Sharecropper
Production function for owner-operator, sharecropper and 
renter is;
V = f (L, K, T) (1)
where;
V = Output
L = Labour as variable input 
K = Cash-capital as fixed factor 
T = Land as fixed facor
The decision to reach maximum profit each party:
1. For owner-operator is
H = VxP - LxW (2)
where:
II = total revenue minus variable cost 
P = unit price of output 
W = unit price of labour 
First order condition for profit maximum is 
311 / 9L = Px 9V/ 9l - W =0
W = Px 9V/ 9l (2a)
2. For renter is
H =VxP - LxW - C (3)
where:
C=land rent as a fixed cost 
First order condition for profit maximum is
9H / 9l =Px 9v/ 9l - W =0
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w = Px 3v/ 3l
3. For sharecropper is
n = VxP -LxW -(r)xVxP 
where:
r =proportion output paid
as land land-rent (assumed 50%) 
First order condition is
3/ 3l=px 3v/ 3l - w - i/2Px 3v/ 3l 
W=1/2P 3v/ 3l
Owner-operator and renter will use the same labour 
input to reach maximum profit (equation 2a and 3a)
By contrast, the sharecropper uses less labour input as
(3b)
(4)
(4a)
shown by equation 4a.
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Appendix 3.1 Characteristics of the Selected Villages 
in West Java, November 1979.
Items Warga. Mari. Suka. Jati
1.Altitude (meter) 10 10 350 350
2.Distance from district capital(km) 25 20 15 17
3.Distance from province capital(km) 120 80 60 50
4.Regular services of public
transportation(minibuses) no no yes yes
5.a.Tbtal of agri.land (Ha) 55.63 93.00 77.21 31.53
b.Size of rice field in the
in the kampung (Ha) 52.45 97.75 23.70 29.50
6.Percentage of sawah area
double-cropped with rice(%) 100 100 74 100
7.Existence of private
fertilizer dealer none none yes yes
8.Distance to village unit
of the Agri.Bank(BRI-UD), in KM 1 3 6 1
9.a.Population in the kampung 691 766 611 475
b.Household in the kampung 138 191 148 95
10.Non-farm household:
a.Landless labourers 58 110 32 21
b.Non cultivating land owner 11 5 11 1
11.Crude agri.density in kampung
a.sawah per household (Ha) 0.38 0.46 0.16 0.31
b.agric.land per household (Ha) 0.40 0.48 0.52 0.33
c.ajusted agri.land per
household (Ha) 0.39 0.47 0.34 0.32
a)assuming productivity of dry land is one half of the sawah land, 
therefore total agricultural land = sawah + 0.5 dry land 
Source: Kasryno,1980,p7
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Appendix 3•2 Distribution of rice field (sawah) Operational- 
holding and Ownership, in Village Jati,
Dry Season 1979
Operational
Holding
Ownership
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 %
Source: Makali and Wiradi, 1980
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Appendix 3.3 Distribution of rice field (sawah) Operational- 
holding and Ownership, in Village Wargabinangun, 
Dry Season 1979
Operational
Holding
Ownership
Source: Makali and Wiradi, 1980
Appendix 3.4 Distribution of rice field (sawah) Operational-
holding and Ownership, in Village Mariuk, 
Dry Season 1979
Operational
Holding
Ownership
Source: Makali and Wiradi, 1980
Appendix 3.5 Distribution of rice field (sawah) Operational- 
holding and Ownership, in Village Sukaambit,
Dry Season 1979
%
Operational
Holding
Ownership
Source: Makali and Wiradi, 1980
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Appendix 4.1 Corelation Matrix for
Cobb-Douglas Production Function
Ln V 1.000
Ln L 0.658 1.000
Ln K 0.644 0.624 1.000
Ln L 0.780 0.773 0.728 1.000
DOO -0.018 0.063 0.110 0.005 1.000
DRT 0.095 0.078 0.095 0.092-0.364 1.000
DLS 0.647 0.637 0.587 0.773 0.019 0.102 1.000
DL1 -0.083-0.056-0.221-0. 152 0.009-0. 182-0.152 1.000
DL2 0.218 0.167 0.206 0.294-0.286 0.405 0.159-0.429 1.000
DL3 0.202 0.081 0.137 0.220 0.040-0.171 0.292-0.288-0.333 1.000
Appendix 4.2 Correlation Matrix for Translog Production B'unction.
LnV 1.000
IjiK 0.644 1.000
LnT 0.780 0.728 1.000
UiL 0.658 0.624 0.773 1.000
(LnL) 0.666 0.624 0.777 0.992 1.000
(LnK) 0.651 0.996 0.731 0.632 6.636 1.000
(LnT) -0.641--0.623-0.896-0.639-0.617-0.606 1.000
LnL. LnK 0.717 0.872 0.821 0.921 0.922 0.880-0.667 1.000
LnL.InT 0.772 0.712 0.981 0.731 0.748 0.724-0.818 0.799 1.000
LnK. InT 0.766 0.652 0.982 0.766 0.779 0.668-0.835 0.791 0.985 1.000
DOO -0.018 0.110 0.005 0.063 0.070 0.120 0.015 0.104 0.000 0.015 1.000
DRT 0.095 0.095 0.092 0.078 0.084 0.091-0.078 0.098 0.104 0.085-0.364 1.000
DL1 -0.083--0.221-0.152-0.056-0.040-0.223 0.099-0.133-0.168-0.124 0.009-0.182 1.000
DL2 0.218 0.206 0.294 0.167 0.166 0.199-0.275 0.200 0.308 0.281-0.286 0.405-0.429 1.000
DLS 0.202 0.137 0.220 0.081 0.074 0.157-0.156 0.114 0.236 0.235 0.040-0.171-0.288-0.333 1.000
DLS 0.647 0.587 0.773 0.637 0.654 0.607-0.547 0.686 0.802 0.795 0.019 0.102-0.152 0.159 0.292 1.000
Appendix 6.1 Cobb-Douglas and Translog Profit Functions
and Related Statistics (estimated by OLS)
Variable Parameter Cobb Douglas Translog
Constant *Ln A 5.6805 6.9995
* * (6.6297)***) (1.8105)*)
Ln W ttL - 0.31033 -5.4808
* * (-2.0332)**) (-3.0756)**'
Ln W .In W 6ll -0.81703
(-1.755)*)
Ln W . Ln T $LT -0.35001
(-1.6124)
Ln W . In K $LK 0.48162
* (2.7637)***
Ln T 3ip 0.74782 2.2951
* (6.2165)***) (2.7741)***
Ln K eK 0.1425 0.01739
2 (1.8328)*) (0.02157)(Ln T) ^TT 0.44784
2 (3.5775)***(Ln K) ‘J’kK 0.00808
(0.0958)
(Ln K) (Ln T) ^TK -0.09180
(-1.1305)
DLS 6* 0.02287 -0.32833
LS (0.11876) (-1.6082)
D00 6* -0.23114 -0.20696
oo (-1.7662)*) (-1.6108)
DRT 6* 0.00899 -0.018648rt (0.045957) (-0.10124)
DL1 6 0.50787 0.488071 (2.7903)***) (2.7300)***
DL2 6 0.23354 0.249632 (1,1494) (1.2567)
DL3 6 0.47652 0.500433 (2.0945)**) (2.2774)**)
R2 0.5861 0.6404
R2 0.5606 0.6019
SEE 0.7011 0•6535
F(9, 146) 24.542***) 18.520***)
Figure in the parentheses are t-value
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Appendix 6.2 Profit and Labour Demand Functions (Owner-operator
versus Sharecropper), and Related Statistics
Variable Parameter Single Equation 
OLS SURE
Constant In A* 5.5930 6.0864
(5.9922)***) (8.6730)***)
Dummies:
Owner (DOO) -0.23306 -0.25275
(-1.6751)**) (-1.8782)**)
Vill.Jati (DL1) «1 0.51953 0.21763
(2.6273)***) (1.4700)*)
Vill.Warga.(DL2) ^2 0.26293 0.019822
(1. 1497)*) (0.11576)
Vill.Mariuk(DL3) 63 0.49579 0.057539
(1.9843)**) (0.30760)
Wages (W ) a* -0.32991 0.055519
L (-1.8668)**) (0.41961)
Capital(K) 6* 0.15260 0.13270K (1.7723)**) (2.0584)**)
Land(T) 3* 0.76142 0.72889
T (7.1.23)***) (9.0811)***)
Labour Demand: B
Owner-operator(DOO) 6* -0.87430 -0.87430op 
+ 2 (-5.2138)***) (-5.2138)***)Sharecropper(DSC) 6SC -0.69468 -0.69468
(-3.5954)***) (-3.5954)***)
(Figure in the parentheses are t-value)
***) Significant at 1% 
**) Significant at 5%
*) Significant at 10%
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Appendix 6.3 Profit and Labour Demand Functions (Owner-operator
versus Renter), and Related Statistics
Variables Parameter
Single Equation 
OLS SURE
Constant In A* 6.6599 6.9658
(5.4699)***) (7.3316)***)
Dummies: I
Owner(DOO) oo -0.23903 -0.19651
(-1.1995) (-1.0611)
Vill.J (DL1) 61 0.45533 0.26108
(2.2288)**) (1.6451)*)
Vill.W (DL2) ^2 0.16642 0.063073
(0.72372) (0.35310)
Vill.M (DL3) 63 0.36865 0.065114
(1.4531) (0.33039)
Wages (W*) a* -0.18390 0.11371L (-1.0993) (0.87507)
Cash Capital (K) $ 0.06462 0.047674
(0.57685) (0.55261)
Land (T) 3* 0.87995 0.86357
Labour Demand: T*1 (6.5949)*** (8.3317)***
Owner Dummy (:doo)6OO -0.87430 -0.87430(-5.3916)***) (-5.3916)***)
Renter Dummy (DRT) 6*t -0.48112 -0.48112
(-1.5494) (-1.5494)
(Figure in the parentheses are t-value)
***) Significant at 1%
**) Significant at 5%
*) Significant at 10%
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Appendix 6.4 Profit and Labour Demand Functions (Sharecropper
versus Renter), and Related Statistics
Variables Parameter
Single Equation 
OLS SURE
Constant 5.6930 6.5336
Ln
Dummies 2
A* (5.0685)***) (8.7121)***)
Sharecropper(DSC) 6*sc -0.042037(-0.2095)
0.048229
(0.26063)
Vill.J (DL1) \ 0.40661 (1.2722) -0.22227(-1.0530)
Vill.W (DL2) 62 0.17860 
(0.55316)
-0.30144
(-1.4138)
Vill.M (DL3) 63 0.52960
(1.3883)
-0.22172
(-0.88012)
Wages (W ) *a -0.46340 -0.19954L (-2.0714)***) (-1.3506)
Cash Cap.(K) *£ 0.13728 0.10467
(1.4077)*) (1.6253)
Land (T) 3 m 0.67497 0.70522
Labour Demand: *1 (5.5237)*** (8.7392)***
Renter Dummy (DRT) 6rt -0.48112
(-1.9779)**)
-0.48112
(-1.9779)**)
Sharecrop.Dummy(DSC) s*2 -0.69468 -0.69468sc (-4.7461)***) (-4.7461)***)
(Figure in the parentheses are t-value)
***) Significant at 1%
**) Significant at 5%
*) Significant at 10%
Appendix 6.5 Profit and labour Demand Functions (Small versus
large Size), and Related Statistics
Variable Parameter Single Equation
OLS
SURE
Constant
Dummies:
In A* 6.0203
(7.2232)***)
6. 1274 
(9.8632)***)
Large Size (DLS) 6*LS -0.01437(-0.0828)
0.06842
(0.46979)
Vill. Jati (DL1) Si 0.52027(3.2332)***) 0.25028(2.0922)**)
Vill. Warga.(DL2) 62 0.39999
(2.2462)**)
0.12738 
(0.9622)
Vill. Mariuk(DL3) 63 0.56306
(2.7096)***)
0.16075 
(1.0405)
Wages (W*) *aL -0.31105(2.0986)**)
0.03440
(0.31218)
Capital (K) e; 0.09109 (1.2174) 0. 10210 ( 1.8356)**)
Land (T) 3* 0.79436 0.71688
Labour Demand: 1 (7.1061)*** (8.6263)***
Large Size Dummy (DLS) 6LS -0.7833
(-5.5019)***)
-0.7833 
(-5.50 19) **:
Small Size Dummy (DSS) r-*2°SS -0.72651(-6.0737)***)
-0.72651
(-6.073)***
(Figure in the parentheses are t-value)
***) Significant at 1%
**) Significant at 5%
*) Significant at 10%
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